By
Tanya Azarchs
:
U.S. bank earnings for the full year and fourth quarter of 2011
reflected all that was good about the US economy, all that was bad
about the global capital markets, and much that was punitive about
the regulatory arena. Loan quality improved and nascent growth
could be detected, but trading revenues were down, and banks
staggered under $35 billion of legal charges related to mortgage
loans sold and the loss of about $7 billion in revenues due to
regulatory changes. As the year ended, major questions about how
those three issues would be resolved still hung in the air, and
promise to bedevil 2012 as well. All that leads analysts to ask,
what of what we saw in 2011 will be the new normal? I believe that
that is too pessimistic a view.
|
Core Net Income*
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4Q2011
|
3Q2011
|
2Q2011
|
1Q2011
|
2011
|
2010
|
| Bank of America |
(590) |
(1,188) |
(7,406) |
2,155 |
(7,333) |
9,832 |
| Citigroup |
2,024 |
2,629 |
2,988 |
3,565 |
11,148 |
11,893 |
| Goldman Sachs |
738 |
170 |
1,236 |
2,686 |
5,202 |
8,909 |
| JPMorgan |
4,336 |
3,363 |
5,367 |
5,443 |
18,486 |
19,642 |
| Morgan Stanley |
311 |
127 |
1,013 |
667 |
2,392 |
3,909 |
| PNC |
765 |
830 |
913 |
837 |
3,495 |
2,965 |
| US Bancorp |
1,143 |
1,273 |
1,203 |
1,046 |
4,665 |
3,317 |
| Wells Fargo |
4,324 |
4,623 |
4,584 |
4,413 |
17,943 |
15,464 |
|
Total
|
52,199
|
47,302
|
39,588
|
83,248
|
55,999
|
75,930
|
*excludes gains on sale, other non-recurring items, and
gains/losses on own debt but includes mortgage-related special
charges
The good news
Tentative US economic growth manifested itself in a pick-up in
commercial lending activity for small and medium sized businesses
in the second half of the year. Syndicated lending activity was
strong as well, and US banks profited from the retreat of European
counterparts to pick up business there. As a result, commercial
loans grew 5.5% for the year.
Loan losses except for first and second residential mortgages
are now at or better than normal levels for a stable economy. Lower
loan losses, as well as reserve reversals, have allowed provisions
to fall by two-thirds from 2009. The corporate sector is healthy.
Credit card portfolios have been cleaned out of the weaker
borrowers, so that card charge-off rates are only about 4.5%, a
level not seen for about 15 years. Provisions remained below the
level of charge-offs during the year but crept upwards to finish at
92% by the first quarter. Reserves were therefore depleted as a
percentage of loans but not in terms of their coverage of annual
losses. Provision expenses will likely level out in 2012 as loss
rates edge down slightly but reserve reversals diminish.
By 2013, provisions could start to climb again. Much will depend
on the pace of mortgage losses however. They remain at very
elevated levels; even though some barely perceptible improvement in
loss rates was visible in 2011, once foreclosures resume, they
could rise again, and take a few years to work through.
Based on these trends, the traditional commercial banks,
especially those that were not large mortgage lenders, were solidly
on the come-back trail. Persistent low interest rates are the
remaining obstacle to achieving normalized profits. Net interest
margins have been in steady decline for three years, but appeared
to stabilize, or even rise a few basis points in the fourth quarter
versus the third.
A stronger economy with rising rates would boost margins because
of the vast amount of "free funds" (e.g. checking deposits, common
equity) on bank balance sheets that could then earn higher
interest.
Investment banking reflects volatile and uncertain
capital markets
For the largest six banks, all of whom have investment banking
or mortgage operations, or both, the story is more troubling. Deep
uncertainty about whether a disorderly unwinding of the European
Union or some of its members could precipitate another financial
meltdown sidelined many participants. Client revenues in trading
fell 20% for the year, especially in the second half:
|
|
Sales and Trading*
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4Q2011
|
3Q2011
|
2Q2011
|
1Q2011
|
4Q2010
|
3Q2010
|
2Q2010
|
1Q2010
|
| Bank of America |
1,858 |
1,071 |
3,778 |
4,895 |
2,538 |
4,444 |
3,112 |
7,001 |
| Citigroup |
1,949 |
2,560 |
3,698 |
5,333 |
3,295 |
4,450 |
4,120 |
6,549 |
| Goldman Sachs |
3,056 |
3,155 |
3,715 |
7,671 |
4,176 |
5,177 |
5,403 |
9,637 |
| JPMorgan |
3,815 |
4,084 |
5,392 |
6,094 |
4,380 |
4,503 |
4,665 |
7,029 |
| Morgan Stanley |
1,996 |
1,981 |
3,192 |
3,203 |
1,999 |
2,161 |
2,879 |
4,089 |
|
Total
|
50,696
|
51,404
|
79,100
|
108,784
|
65,552
|
82,940
|
80,716
|
137,220
|
| *Excludes the
effect of gain/loss on own debt |
|
|
|
|
|
|
The fourth quarter was pretty flat with the third if we consider
that Citigroup (
C
) had a $900 million negative swing factor from the hedges it
maintains on its loan portfolio, which GAAP rules require to be
recorded on the trading income line rather than netted against loan
portfolio values. The fixed income desks were the primary culprits
in the weak performance, while equity trading was relatively flat
for the year.
Fee income from advisory and underwriting followed the same
trajectory although they were down only 7% for the year. M&A
and advisory revenues were up but volatile markets wreaked havoc
with IPO's so equity underwriting was weak.
|
Investment banking income
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4Q2011
|
3Q2011
|
2Q2011
|
1Q2011
|
4Q2010
|
3Q2010
|
2Q2010
|
1Q2010
|
| Bank of America |
1,013 |
942 |
1,684 |
1,578 |
1,590 |
1,371 |
1,319 |
1,240 |
| Citigroup |
638 |
736 |
1,085 |
851 |
1,167 |
930 |
674 |
1,057 |
| Goldman Sachs |
863 |
781 |
1,448 |
1,269 |
1,507 |
1,159 |
941 |
1,204 |
| JPMorgan |
1,133 |
1,052 |
1,933 |
1,793 |
1,833 |
1,476 |
1,421 |
1,461 |
| Morgan Stanley |
1,051 |
1,031 |
1,695 |
1,214 |
1,757 |
1,221 |
1,080 |
1,060 |
|
Total
|
18,792
|
18,168
|
31,380
|
26,820
|
31,416
|
24,628
|
21,740
|
24,088
|
Worthy of note is that certain banks have held up better in this
environment on both aspects of investment banking. JPMorgan (
JPM
) and Morgan Stanley (
MS
) saw less erosion of trading income over the past two years, while
Citigroup and Goldman Sachs (
GS
) suffered a greater decline in investment banking fees than did
their peers.
Could this lower level of trading profits be a sign of
structural changes in the markets rather than a cyclical funk? The
justifications for a cyclical phenomenon are abundant:
- Market volatility and the very real potential for a very
uncomfortable outcome of events in Europe, both from an economic
growth perspective and a financial market stability perspective
have investors sidelined.
- A slow economy dampens investment and therefore capital
raising.
- Spread widening in the debt markets is very real and would
naturally have caused losses on inventory
- The Volcker rule is not yet in effect. Although banks have
mostly disposed of their purely proprietary operations, these had
never made much in earnings so are unlikely to be
responsible.
- Uncertainty over regulatory treatments of various
instruments, including derivatives, may be deterrents but only
temporarily, until there is clarity
- Mortgage related activity is cyclically low. This had
accounted for a large portion of capital markets activity
The case for a structural shift is that structured credit (and
related credit derivatives) used to be a major source of revenues
pre-2007. It may never return to its full glory. That factor did
not change between the second and third quarters of 2011, when
trading income dropped off precipitously, so it could not have been
the cause.
The important issue to watch, however, is the final form of the
Volcker rule. If it is adopted in such a form that it hampers
market-making activities and bank's ability to provide liquidity to
markets, it could have a long-term deleterious effect on the
economy, on capital markets and, by implication, on trading profits
and indeed on the whole of investment banking business for US
banks
Mortgage banking remains an albatross
While mortgage refinancing activity appeared to revive in the
latter part of the year, the four mega-mortgage banks struggled
under the huge weight of provisions for compensating the GSE's and
investors for alleged misrepresentations of the quality of loans
sold into securitization vehicles during the mortgage boom. Charges
for representations and warranties, litigation and other related
issues totaled $35 billion for 2011, on top of a like amount taken
over the three prior years. Bank of America (
BAC
) has been taking the largest hits, paying for the exceptionally
poor quality of loans originated by the Countrywide unit it
acquired in 2007.
|
|
Reps and Warranties |
Foreclosed asset & litigation |
| Bank of America |
2,654 |
5,280 |
| Citigroup |
647 |
- |
| JPMorgan |
2,124 |
5,207 |
| Wells Fargo |
2,654 |
2,118 |
More charges are on the way. The joint suits being brought by
the Attorneys General of most of the states, could be settled over
the next couple of months. If the settlement is $25-28 billion for
the top five lenders, as rumored, litigation reserves of only about
$22 billion at these four banks will not be sufficient (see my
third quarter overview
). While hopefully the settlement will include indemnification from
some of the other related liabilities, other litigation will likely
continue for several years.
Other mortgage related costs are also very high. Processing
delinquent mortgage loans especially in light of new regulations,
as well as astronomical losses on mortgage loans in their
on-balance sheet loans create a significant drag on earnings for
these banks.
Strategic Decisions On Hold
Uncertainty about the ultimate regulatory standards has left
certain strategic decisions on hold:
-
Dividends and share buybacks
. Results regulatory stress tests due in March should not yield
any nasty surprises but will provide insight into just how much
banks will be permitted to raise dividends or repurchase stock.
In addition, finalization of the Basel III rules and particularly
the amount of surplus the "systemically important" banks will
have to hold above the 7% of Tier 1 common equity.
-
Disinvestments in investment banking
. The Volker Rule on proprietary trading activities is very
contentious. Under certain proposals it could hamper market
making activities and have a very significant effect on trading
revenues. New rules on clearing and exchange trading of
derivatives could affect the derivatives business. In addition,
if capital markets do not recover in the course of the year,
meaning that if the European situation is not clarified, staff
downsizing could be required.
-
Potential sales of businesses.
The penalties for being large, both in terms of additional
capital charges and in terms of additional regulatory oversight
could prompt some to break up their banks. Also Basel 2.5
potentially assigns risk weights to certain activities that banks
deem will preclude earning a reasonable rate of return and so
will seek to divest. So far, banks have identified correlation
trading, certain structured credit activities, private equity and
hedge fund ownership, and mortgage servicing assets as areas for
wind-down or divestiture.
We can expect to see such decisions come down starting mid-year
in 2012.
Meanwhile, the falloff in revenues has already resulted in
belt-tightening and staff reductions. Operating expense ratios
(noninterest expenses as a percentage of revenues) are at untenable
levels even if we strip out all of the litigation and reps and
warranties expenses.
|
Expense/Revenues*
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011
|
2010
|
2009
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Bank of America |
72.6% |
53.7% |
52.0% |
|
|
|
|
|
| Citigroup |
61.2% |
52.7% |
61.8% |
|
|
|
|
|
| Goldman Sachs¹ |
73.6% |
64.6% |
56.1% |
|
|
|
|
|
| JPMorgan |
57.6% |
47.4% |
46.7% |
|
|
|
|
|
| Morgan Stanley |
86.0% |
78.6% |
78.5% |
|
|
|
|
|
| PNC |
59.6% |
54.3% |
54.0% |
|
|
|
|
|
| Wells Fargo |
52.7% |
49.8% |
47.8% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total
|
63.8%
|
53.9%
|
53.6%
|
|
|
|
|
|
| * excludes gains on
sale of assets, litigation and reps and warranties expenses
and other non-recurring items |
Banks have reacted by announcing various expense reduction
programs whose impact will mostly kick in in 2012. These have
included layoffs and various re-engineering efficiencies. These are
merely in response to what is clear to management about the state
of affairs to date, but do not reflect any of the important
strategic decisions yet to be taken, as mentioned above. As those
firm up, we can expect more cutting.
These ratios may not return to previous levels. Some revenues
have been lost as a result of legislation: over $7 billion in
overdraft fees, and credit and debit card fees. It is an open
question whether they can be replaced. Heavy expenses to service
delinquent mortgages are here for the medium term at least. And
increased compliance costs for new regulations are here to stay.
Efficient operations and the ability to rein in bonuses may become
a distinguishing feature of successful banks.
Capital Standards May Restrict Dividends and
Buybacks
The focus is shifting to the new Basel III capital standards.
Even though they will not be fully in effect until 2019, the
competitive arena may force banks to reach the fully phased in
rules much earlier, perhaps a year from now. All but Bank of
America among the largest eight banks in the US would be fully
compliant with the base 7% of Tier 1 common to risk weighted assets
requirement today. Bank of America is probably around 6.3%; others
fall between 7.4% and 8.2%, with Citigroup at the high end.
However, systemically important banks will need a buffer over that,
perhaps as high as 2.5%. To reach the full 9.5%, these banks will
need an additional $146 billion of retained earnings over the next
couple of years; about $60 billion of that would be for Bank of
America, which represents a 50% increase to current capital. For
all banks, such numbers would preclude dividend increases. Bank of
America succeeded in increasing its Tier 1 common ratio by 1.2
percentage points in the fourth quarter through asset sales that
produced gains while at the same time reducing risk weighted
assets. However, it has completed most of the slated sales so
further increases will be slower. It will take several years to
robust retained earnings to reach the goal. If, on the other hand,
the requirement is only 8.5%, the capital shortfall is only $14
billion, a much more manageable number that will permit more
payments to shareholders.
Prognosis for 2012
This year could prove to be the one in which many of the
questions overhanging the industry will be clarified: regulation,
certain critical litigation, Eurozone survival. That will clear the
way for some strategic decisions. The housing markets will likely
still be struggling, producing a long tail of high servicing costs,
high write-off levels and a battery of litigation expenses, albeit
at a lower level after the attorney's general settlement
occurs.
However, in an economy that is growing, with at least a
stabilization in housing markets, both revenues and profit margins
have a chance of expanding. Investment banking income should
improve, cost cutting efforts should kick in, and net interest
margins should expand. Banks should be able to returns to a
substantially higher level of profits, if not the heyday pre-crisis
levels. The new normal will begin to shine through (see
Is There A Future For Bank Earnings?
).
Disclosure:
I am long [[C]], [[MS]], [[JPM]], [[WFC]].
See also
Is Frontier Communications A Long-Lerm Buy?
on seekingalpha.com