3 Reasons Why the Treasury Should Borrow Now to Restructure and Rebuild

By Lawrence J. Kramer,

Shutterstock photo
Lawrence J. Kramer submits:

Alan Mulally is credited with saving Ford Motor Company ( F ) by borrowing as much as he could - $23 billion - in 2006, before the credit crunch hit other U.S. businesses, to fund a major turn-around of the company's business. Uncle Sam needs to take a page from Mr. Mulally's book.

Because our private borrowers cannot absorb all the risk-averse capital our massive trade deficit brings in, the Treasury has an opportunity to borrow long-term at rates that seem ridiculously low in light of our national debt and continuing deficits. The money is just lying there. All the Treasury has to do is pick it up.

The biggest obstacle to this tactic is the skepticism of Republicans and their supporters, skepticism that is not entirely unwarranted (even if to some extent disingenuous) but is in any event ill-timed. Yes, w aste has been the hallmark of Congressional spending over the years, and conservatives do not want to give the liberal Congress another nickel to squander. But I think we need to think long and hard before passing up a borrowing opportunity this good.

Let me make clear that I'm not advocating purely Keynesian deficit spending, at least not as I use the term "deficit." I am advocating issuing a ton of long-term notes and bonds. The use is a separate matter, although I've got some thoughts on that, too. I am proposing three uses of the funds, only one of which is spending of any sort, and that's on investments that add more value to our national balance sheet than they cost.

1. Extend Maturities.

Low-rate, short-term debt is riskier to issue than low-rate, long-term debt. Short-term debt has to be rolled over and can become high-rate short-term debt if the market refuses to roll it over and the Fed is not willing or able to buy it. If we can get out of this recession, the Fed will want to raise short-term rates in order to prevent the economy from overheating. Hopefully, depression-expert Bernanke will show more restraint than Marriner Eccles did in 1936, but at some point, the Fed must tighten, and when that happens, the Treasury should not be caught with a ton of T-bills to roll over.

There are about $2 trillion in T-Bills now outstanding. So, every 1% increase in the T-Bill rate adds $20 billion to the deficit. The increase in pay-out seems inflationary even as the increased cost of borrowing is anti-inflationary. And 5-6% is not an unusual T-Bill yield when the Fed is tightening. That's $100 billion in additional deficit relative to today just to service T-Bills, if we still have $2 trillion outstanding.

If the need to roll over a large amount of bills will hamper the Fed's efforts to slow the economy when it needs to be slowed, one of the best things that we could do with long-term borrowing would be to retire a significant amount of short-term debt, even at the 3-4% difference in interest that would apply right now. And long-term debt can be "repaid" in part by inflation.

Inflating away the debt is a time-honored strategy. See Aizenman and Marion, " Using inflation to erode the US public debt ," 2009.) As this table (Joshua Aizenman and Nancy P. Marion © voxEU.org) shows, the U.S. has, until recently, matched the maturity of its debt to the magnitude of its debt: The more we owe, the longer-term we have borrowed, and the more inflation has done to repay it.

Click to enlarge:

With our public debt now approaching 90% of GDP, history suggests that we should be at an average maturity of 100 months or so, not the 50 months currently applicable. Whether we can issue enough long-term debt at reasonable rates remains to be seen, but we can certainly issue more than we have, and we should at least be working our way out the maturity curve as far as we can go.

I should add that inflation works to devalue debt only to the extent that inflation is not priced into the bonds in the first place. When the real rate of return on the debt is below the real growth rate of GDP, inflation hurts the bondholder. Otherwise, the inflation premium the investor demanded can be added to principal to offset inflation. But there are times when the market under-prices long-term debt, and when that happens, issuers should move quickly to exploit the arbitrage maturities. I believe that now is such a time.

2. Get Rid of TIPs.

As of November, 2009, the Treasury had issued $550 Billion worth of Treasury Inflation-Protected bonds, a/k/a "TIPs," perhaps the dumbest idea anyone in government has ever had. That's about 8% of the outstanding Treasury debt. What, really, were they thinking when they came up with this monster? How are we ever going to inflate our way out of debt that is inflation-protected? (I know what they were thinking - a low coupon in a period of low-inflation.) But still. What hubris to think we would never need to monetize our debt, when our very willingness to issue this financial accelerant shouts from the rooftop that we haven't the brains or will-power to escape that fate.

TIPs put us in a bind like that created by short-term bills: the rate of return is adjusted semi-annually and is beyond the Government's control. Thus, despite their nominal maturity, the economic maturity of TIPs is zero. (I assume - but cannot say with authority - that the nominal maturity of TIPs is reflected in the table above, which distorts the maturity upward without providing an enhanced opportunity for monetization.)

So long as raising interest rates depresses inflation, then TIPs aren't a problem. But, if raising short-term rates proves inflationary because so much of our debt is short term, TIPs will only make matters worse. Thus, along with taking advantage of current low long-term rates to move the nation's debt out the yield curve, the Treasury should buy back TIPs. That way when the time comes to raise short-term rates, the Fed will actually have the flexibility to do so.

3. Upgrade the Infrastructure.

Not all of the money borrowed should be used to replace existing debt. After all, re-funding debt requires no new money, so it shouldn't put much of a dent in the demand for Treasury paper. The whole point of the exercise is to borrow as much new money as possible at these low rates. That new money should be put to work putting people to work - on rebuilding our obsolete and decrepit infrastructure. Roads, bridges, aqueducts, power grid, high-speed rail, air-traffic control, alternative energy all need attention.

With so many unemployed workers, especially in construction, infrastructure projects are the perfect Keynesian antidote to what ails us. We just need the smarts to use long-term borrowing now (when the money is cheap) to fund the work, even the longer-term projects that won't be done until later.

And we need to get cracking, because Medicare is preparing to swallow all of our cash as fast as we can print it. Indeed, one of the best things we can do for our infrastructure would be to upgrade our healthcare delivery systems in advance of the coming crunch. But more about unfunded obligations later. For now, our leaders need to recognize that the infrastructure needs work, and our workers need work. And money is cheap, so if not now, when?

Disclosure: No positions

See also Nasdaq 100 Stocks Within 10% of Their 52-Week Low on seekingalpha.com

The views and opinions expressed herein are the views and opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Nasdaq, Inc.

This article appears in: Investing US Markets
Referenced Stocks: F , IPE , LTPZ , STPZ , TIP , TIPZ

More from SeekingAlpha



Follow on:

Find a Credit Card

Select a credit card product by:
Select an offer:
Data Provided by BankRate.com